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Two decades ago Anthony Downs presented his economic 
theory of democracy, in the course of which he provided a model of 
the individual vote decision. 1 While recognizing that uncertainty 
permeated the vote decision, Downs chose against full incorporation 
of uncertainty into his model. Subsequent work on rational voting 
has generally followed Downs lead in admitting that uncertainty 
exists but proceeding.as if it did not. Paradoxically, formal 
models of candidate preference have been remarkably informal in 
their treatment of uncertainty effects. 2 
This paper examines how rational voters might choose 
between candidates under conditions of uncertainty. We shall 
emphasize two rational voting approaches -- "defensive voting" 
and "credulous voting" -- which have previously escaped notice. 
Additionally, we shall map out some of the implications of 
electoral uncertainty for empirical tests of the rational model 
and for the development of spatial theory. We shall not attempt 
to prove how citizens decide to vote, but we shall expand 
considerably the conventional interpretation of rational voting. 
CHOOSING A CANDIDATE: THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY 
The behavioral literature on voting has focused on a 
variety of factors in trying to answer why citizens prefer one 
candidate over another. Such factors include group allegiances,3 
party identification and short-term attitudes toward the candidates 
2 
and issues,4 and the relation between the citizen's issue positions 
and those advocated by the competing candidates. 5 In contrast to 
the complexity of the empirical literature, the theoretical 
literature on candidate preference is simple and straightforward. 
Models of the voting decision have abetracted from the richness 
of the empirical literature and posited a party differential which 
neatly summarizes a citizen's candidate evaluations.6 The citizen 
imagines what his overall welfare level would be given Lhe election 
of candidate A, compares this estimate with that given the election 
of candidate B, and prefers the candidate whose associated 
welfare level is higher. The party differential is the difference 
between these two estimates. 
This theoretical discussion of the party differential is 
neat and tidy, deceptively so. In passing from the rich complexity 
of the empirical literature to the stark simplicity of the 
theoretical, an important consideration is left behind: the 
pervasive uncertainty facing the citizen. No matter how calculated, 
the party differential is an estimate shrouded in uncertainty. 
Uncertainty enters into the voting act in a number of 
ways. There is first the uncertainty attributable to the voter 
his lack of information, or limitations on his information processing 
Capacl.'ty.7 A d'd . h can i ate mig t project a specific policy position 
on an issue only to have the citizen misperceive that position. 
Statistically, the citizen perceives the true candidate position 
plus (possibly) an error term. Given such misperception, an 
inaccurate party differential may lead the citizen to vote for a 
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candidate who actually would provide less utility than an available 
opponent. 
Second, there is uncertainty which stems from the behavior 
of the competing candidates. Such uncertainty takes two forms. 
"Equivocation" occurs when the candidate says different things to 
different audiences, while "vagueness" exists when the candidate 
conceals his exact intentions. Equivocation produces a range of 
perceived candidate positions across the electorate, with different 
citizens perceiving different positions. The citizen, in effect, 
takes a sample of a single candidate position from the range of 
positions the candidate projects and then uses that position to 
calculate the party differential. In contrast, vagueness (such as 
Nixon's announcement in the 1968 cawpaign of a secret plan to end 
the Vietnam War) produces a range of perceived candidate positions 
within each citizen. Note that in this latter case even the n•ost 
informed, intelligent elements of the electorate wjll have party 
differentials which are uncertain estimates. 8 
Finally, there are uncertainties inherent in the electoral 
process. All citizens realize that future events and situations are 
inherently uncertain. Thus, they must choose their government without 
full knowledge of the agenda that government will face. Elected 
officials may justifiably abandon past promises in the face of 
changing circumstances and issues. Additionally, candidates have 
been known to lie, or at least to give the appearance thereof; the 
ele ctoral process does not bind candidates to their previously 
stated positions. Moreover, no candidate can enact and enforce a 
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policy all by himself. Even if the candidate is clear and honest, 
he might have to accept compromises in order to have his programs 
made into public policy by the legislature, the courts, and the 
bureaucracy. As a result of these factors, citizens realize that 
situations change, that candidates may be lying, and that candidates 
eventually have to compromise their positions. Facing such strong 
uncertainties even the informed citizen knows that he can regard 
a candidate's stated positions only as rough indicators of some 
range of public policies which might eventually result from the 
candidate's election. Statistically, the citizen places an 
interval around the point location projected by the candidate, so 
that the citizen perceives a range of possible issue positions for 
a candidate even when the candidate projects only a single issue 
point. 
Table 1 summarizes these several sources of uncertainty. 
The candidate may project either a point or a range and the citizen 
may perceive a point or range either accurately or inaccurately. 
Note also that these various forms of uncertainty are likely to 
occur in combinations. The candidate may project a point, but the 
citizen may both misperceive that point and construct a range 
around the misperceived point. The candidate may project a range, 
but the voter may misperceive its end points. The previous 
literature has recognized the possibility of misperception, along 
with the uncertainty due to the electoral process. But once it is 
recognized that the uncertainty related to the electoral process 
cannot be eliminated from voting, the nature of the 
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decision-making problem facing the citizen is fundamentally 
transformed. The citizen may perceive the candidate as a range 
of issue positions rather than as a single issue point, and this 
could have important effects on both empirical and formal analyses 
of voting. 
(Table 1 here) 
These various forms of uncertainty are no doubt the 
root cause of the complexity of the empirical literature on 
candidate preference. Voter uncertainty? Use expert advice or 
the endorsements of reference groups. Candidate ambiguity? Consult 
party labels and group endorsements. An unpredictable future? 
Consult past performance, ideology, and party identification. 
The variety of "determinants" of the citizen's candidate preference 
simply reflects the continuous attempt to clarify the ambiguous 
political stimuli constantly faced by the citizen. 
But despite the preceding array of uncertainty-reducing 
factors, a residue of uncertainty inevitably remains. Past 
performance cannot tell us how the candidate will respond to new 
issues which may arise, nor can group allegiances based on past 
performance. At best, these devices can suggest bounds on the 
activities a candidate is likely to undertake; Ted Kennedy's 
urban policy is not likely to include mass executions in the 
central cities. A range of possibilities is suggested, not a 
precise point. 
The foregoing discussion is prelude to a simple 
observation: A citizen's estimate of a candidate's position in an 
Citizen Perceives 
Point accurately 
Range accurately 
Point or range 
inaccurately 
TABLE 1. TYPES OF VOTING UNCERTAINTY 
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Candidate Projects 
Point 
Certainty 
Uncertainty due to 
the electoral process 
Uncertainty due to 
voter's limited 
information 
Uncertainty due 
to candidate's 
equivocation 
Uncertainty due 
to eandidate's 
vagueness 
Uncertainty due 
to voter's 
information 
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issue space is likely to be much less precise than typically assumed 
in electoral theory (or typically measured in empirical research). 
As a consequence, spatial theories based on precise candidate 
locations are insufficiently general in that the candidate 
strategies they deduce may be inappropriate when uncertainty is 
taken into more complete account. Correspondingly, the information 
obtained by empirical studies of candidate position-taking may not 
have the meaning that is generally assumed. 
To address these contentions, consider the seven-point 
issue scales devised by the 1968 election surveys of Brody and 
Page and subsequently adopted by the Center for Political Studies. 
The respondent is shown a seven-point scale relating to an issue 
with the two end points labeled (such as seeking immediate with-
drawal or military victory in the Vietnam War) , and the respondent 
is asked his or her own position on the scale along with the 
positions of the presidential nominees on the same scale. In 
attempts to operationalize the spatial model of voting, the 
differences between the respondent's position and the respondent's 
perception of the candidates' positions have been used to measure 
the party differential. But what happens if the respondent perceives 
the candidate as a range on the scale·rather than as a single point? 
When a citizen tells an interviewer that Hubert H. 
Humphrey is at position four on a seven-point scale, he � 
believe that Humphrey is exactly at position four. A much mor.e 
likely possibility is that he believes Humphrey is somewhere between 
two and five, or three and six, or whatever. He simply obliges the 
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interviewer by settling on an exact point. But what does a point 
estimate of a candidate position really signify? And, how do 
citizens use such point estimates to calculate their party 
differentials? These are separate questions which might have 
different answers. 
We know of no way to answer the first question with data 
presently available. Are citizens intu
.
itive statisticians who 
consistently reveal the mean of their judgmental distributions to 
the interviewer? We will make the standard assumption that this is 
the case, but we recognized it will not always be correct. 
Consider, for example, a citizen who believes that Richard Nixon 
will either pull out of Vietnam or escalate the war. His 
subjective distribution over a seven-point scale might appear as in 
figure 1. Where will this citizen place Nixon on the scale? At 
the mean -- about four -- even though he is certain that Nixon is 
not at four? Or will he select one of the more likely end points, 
one or seven? Assuming that citizens invariably respond with 
means may very well lead to error in some unknown fraction of 
cases, but there is no alternative to the assumption at present. 
Immediate 
Withdrawal 
Status 
Quo 
Military 
Victory 
t�J 
Figure 1: Hypothetical Nixon Policy Distribution on ICPR 
Seven-Point Vietnam Scale 
9 
Having assumed that citizens reveal mean candidate 
positions, the next question is whether those means determine the 
party differential. The citizen who wants to pull out of Vietnam 
immediately might say that Nixon is at position four on the scale 
but still might compute his party differential based on the 
possibility that Nixon is at position one or on the possibility 
that Nixon is at position seven. Assume our same citizen judges 
Humphrey's Vietnam position as in figure 2 with a mean of four. 
Is the citizen's party differential on Vietnam then necessarily 
zero? Or do other parameters of his judgmental distributions 
come into play? The next section of this paper explores the 
possibilities, 
1 2 
Figure 2: Hypothetical Humphrey Policy Distribution 
on !CPR Seven-Point Vietnam Scale 
ALTERNATIVE CALCULATIONS OF THE PARTY DIFFERENTIAL 
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Most formal analyses presume that the citizen's calculation 
of the party differential is a decision made under certainty --
perfect information about the positions of the candidates. Only 
Shepsle has performed an analysis which explicitly includes 
uncertainty in the candidate preference decision, an analysis which 
10 
9 builds on strong simplifying assumptions. Each candidate presents 
himself as a lottery: a probability distribution over a policy 
space (one dimensional in Shepsle's analysis). This lottery is 
"objective" in the sense that every citizen perceives the same 
lottery, and this objective lottery is completely under the control 
of the candidate, Given these assumptions Shepsle carries o�t an 
analysis of electoral competition under uncertainty. But his work 
is relative to a particular model of decision-making under 
uncertainty. Shepsle's voters are expected utility maximizers: 
their choices over lotteries satisfy the axioms of Von Neumann-
10 Morgenstern expected utility theory. Given an electorate which
makes decisions in accord with some other theory of decision-making 
under uncertainty, different conclusions may follow. In this 
section we will illustrate via examples, the voting decisions of 
citizens who follow different models of decision-making under 
uncertainty. We also will discuss the kind of voter psychology 
which might suggest adoption of one model rather than another and 
the role of partisanship and candidate orientatj_on for the different 
types of voters. 
Model 1: Voting as Expected Utility Maximizing 
Consider the following example in figure 3. 
Immediate 
Withdrawal 
1 2 
Candidate A: 1/3 
Candidate B: 
l/7 1/7 
3 
1/3 
1/7 
* 
4 5 
1/3 
1/7 1/7 
6 
Military 
Victory 
7 
1/7 1/7 
Figure 3: Illustration of Expected Utility Maximizing: 
Voter Id�al Point and Perceived Candidate 
Distributions 
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In this example, the voter's ideal point is at four on the scale. 
Assume he has a symmetric single-peaked utility function so that 
u(3) = u(5), u(2) = u(6) etc. Assume candidate A is perceived as a 
discrete rectangular distribution over the range two to four on 
the scale, while candidate B is perceived as a discrete rectangular 
distribution over the range one to seven. Which candidate does 
the citizen prefer? 
so 
If the voter is an expected utility maximizer, 
EU (A) 
= 
u(2) + u(3) + u(4) 
3 
EU (B) u(l) + u(2) + u(3) + u(4) + u(5) + u(6) + u(7) 
7 
2u(l) + 2u(2) + 2u(3) + u(4) 
7 
(by the symmetry of the 
utility function 
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EU (A):- EU (B) = 7u(2) + 7u(3) + 7u(4) - 6u(l) - 6u(2) - 6u(3) - 3u(4) 
2 1  
u(2) + u(3) + 4u(4) - 6u(l) > 0 
2 1  
(since u(4)>u(3)>u(2)>u(l) 
by the singlepeakedness 
of the utility function) 
Thus, the expected utility maximizing citizen prefe�s candidate A. 
Note that the conventional spatial model of voting and the 
proximity measures based on that model which have been used by 
empirical researchers would lead to error in this example . If the 
citizen gives the interviewer the means of his judgmental distributions 
of the positions of the two candidates, he would be recorded as 
closer to candidate B whose mean is four rather than A whose mean is 
three. Yet we see that A is more preferred when the voter's preference 
function and decision rule enter the picture. 1 1  The proximity 
measures can be misleading if the citizen views the candidates as 
ranges rather than as single points. 
What kind of a voter is an expected utility maximizer? He 
is a voter with a complete transitive preference ordering over 
certain alternatives and over lotteries formed from those alternatives. 
He satisfies a strong substitutability axiom, and he receives no 
utility or disutility from the uncertainty of his decision context. 
Less formally, the expected utility maximizer behaves as if he has 
a complete probability distribution (objective or subjective) over 
the positions each candidate might adopt. He is permitted to be 
uncertain, but his uncertainty is presumed to be of a rather precise 
nature. In the terminology of an earlier era, his uncertainty is 
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reducible to risk, a condition in which ambiguity or uncertainty is 
quantifiable as probabilities. 
On the normative level, expected utility and subjective 
expected utility models reign supreme. 12 On the experimental level, 
a considerable amount of negative evidence exists. 13 And on the 
level of empirical political research, the little data that is 
available suggests similar doubts about the universal applicability 
of expected utility models. 14 If we keep an open mind, then, what 
are the alternatives? 
Model 2: Defensive Voting, 
Recall figures 1 and 2 which portray a voter's judgments 
about the Vietnam policies of Nixon and Humphrey as in figure 4. 
Immediate 
Withdrawal 
Status 
Quo 
Military 
Victory 
Figure 4: Hypothetical Candidate Distributions on 
Seven-Point Vietnam Scale 
--- Humphrey 
- Nixon 
Given that the means of his judgmental distributions are both four, 
the standard proximity analysis would treat this voter as indifferent 
between Nixon and Humphrey on Vietnam (no matter what the 
characteristics of his utility function). But the voter might 
reason as follows: "There is a chance that Ni'xon will follow a 
policy further from me in either the more hawkish or more dovish 
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'directions than will Humphrey. Thus, I insure myself against the 
furthest deviation from my preferences by voting for Humphrey." 
This is a kind of "minimax" decision-making. For each 
candidate estimate the possible policy position furthest from your 
own, then support the candidate whose furthest policy is closer. 
Clearly, the minimax consideration might enter the voting decision 
given the very different judgmental distributions of candidate 
positions presumed in the above example. Would such a model of 
decision-making also enter the voting decision when the judgmental 
distributions are of comparable shape, but of different mean? 
Perhaps not. But such a decision-making rule might be used when 
the voter is unable to form a distribution over a candidate's 
possible positions -- when he considers himself to be in a classic 
uncertainty situation in which probabilities are unknown or not 
even meaningful. Perhaps he can pin each candidate to a range of 
policy positions, but has little sense of what is ,likely within 
each range. 
Again, the minimax decision-maker might confound the 
empirical analysis of proximity measures. Consider the example in 
figure 5. 
* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cand'idate A: 
Candidate B: 
Figure 5: Illustration of Defensive Voting: Voter Ideal 
Point and Perceived Candidate Distributions 
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Assume the individual has a single-peaked preference function 
symmetric about an ideal point of five. The mean of candidate A's 
positions is five, the voter's ideal point, while the mean of candidate 
B's possible positions is four. According to the simple proximity 
measures a vote for candidate A results. But the minimax voter 
reasons that candidate B at the worst will be 1.5 units from his 
ideal point whereas candidate A could be two units away. Hence, he 
votes for B. 
Minimax voting is defensive voting. The citizen goes 
through a worst case analysis, and defends himself against the 
worst. 15 Empirically, such behavior is not so foolish. Take the
citizen who is highly uncertain about the exact policy positions of 
a candidate but who can use such devices as party identification and 
group endorsements to pin the candidate down in a certain area of 
the policy space. Why should some central point in this range 
count more than the point furthest from his ideal? Moreover, 
the candidates themselves may induce the voter to behave in such a 
manner. Faced with "shoot from the hip" Goldwater, a worst case 
analysis makes considerable sense. Goldwater might start a nuclear 
war. Were American voters saying that they thought such actions 
would occur under Goldwater, or were they just expressing a nagging 
fear that such actions might occur? 
Party identification and candidate orientation might be 
used by the defensive voter to simplify his choice. Why rely 
promises when he can rely on past party performances to bound 
possible candidate behavior? In particular, the defensive voter 
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who feels that he (or his social group) has been injured by one 
party might identify with and vote for the other party until it too 
injures him. The politically independent would then consist of 
two groups: those citizens who feel equally injured by both 
parties, and those young citizens who do not feel that either party 
has injured their interests (and who have lost their sense of 
identification with their parents' social groups.which had been 
injured by a party in an earlier historical era). 
Additionally, the defensive voter can focus on whether a 
candidate appears irresponsible and thus likely to do his worst. 16
If the incumbent president has not yet injured the citizen, he 
might support his reelection rether than take the chance of a less 
than certain opponent, The defensive voter may greet the candidate 
of a religion, race, ethnic group, or region very different from 
his own with particular suspicion. The partisan defensive voter 
would support his own party's candidate, unless that candidate 
seems irresponsible. 
Model 3: Credulous Voting 
Real world elections have Eisenhowers running as well as 
Goldwaters. Just as a voter might go through a worse case analysis, 
so he might on occasion go through a best case analysis. 17 In the 
example used to illustrate· defensive voting (figure 4), the decision 
would reverse if a voter were engaging in a credulous or optimistic 
analysis. Candidate B is less uncertain, but at best he will end 
up .5 units from the citizen's ideal point, candidate A _!llight end up 
exactly on the citizen's ideal, so he receives the citizen's vote. 
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We· doubt that credulous voting is very common, at least 
in our more recent elections. Still, the occasional widely loved 
and revered candidate might stimulate such a popular response. At 
least, the committed partisan might engage in a best case analysis 
for his party's candidate and a worst case analysis for the opposi­
tion candidate. And perhaps there are some citizens in the electorate 
who generally take an optimistic, credulous attitude toward politics. 
(Barnum believed such ci tizens were common). 
Notice that partisanship and candidate orientation would 
have a relatively different role in credulous voting than in 
defensive voting. The credulous voter is strongly influenced by 
campaign promises and may switch parties quickly when the other 
party begins to make better promises. In particular, the credulous 
voter may depart from his traditional partisanship quite readily 
when the opposition candidate seems totally credible. Especially 
believable candidates (such as . members of one's own religion, race, 
ethnic group, and region) might induce credulous voting. 
Model 4: Mixed Model Voting 
An obvious possibility is that voters use some mix of the 
three decision models we have discussed, Perhaps the voter makes 
an estimate of a candidate's mean or most likely position, then 
adjusts that decision by taking into account the best and worst 
h · h h d of the cand4date.
18 he mig t receive at t e an s • Or he might 
adopt a sequential strategy: eliminate from consideration any 
candidate who threatens a totally unacceptable position and then 
18 
choose from among the remaining candidates (if more than one remain) 
on the basis of which provides the greater expected utility or the 
greater maximal benefit, In practice, using the mean or mode and 
the extreme points of a candidate's position distribution might 
approximate the kind of comprehensive decision-making presumed by 
expected utility theories. 
SUMMARY 
We can summarize these several models in terms of "The 
Voting Question" which the voter asks himself in deciding how to 
19 
vote. The expected utility rule asks: "On average, whose issue 
positions will provide me greater utility?" The cynical defensive 
voting question is: "How can I best avoid getting screwed?" while 
the credulous voter asks "If I am lucky, who might do the best for 
me?" The mixed model voter asks the most complex voting question: 
"How do I weight my expecta tions, my fears, and my hopes?" 
Which of these models holds true for actual voting? We 
would suspect that each does for Rome citizens, with respect to 
some candidates, and at some elections. Voting under certainty 
must occur, but so too would expected utility maximization, defensive 
voting, credulous voting, and the mixed model approaches. It is 
most unlikely that any single model would always prevail, but instead 
20 we should expect each to be of some importance. The result is a 
considerable expansion of what we would l..orm rational voting from 
the narrow view incorporated in models of voting as decision-making 
under certainty. 
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Empirical evidence as to how citizens calculate the party 
differential could be obtained by framing survey questions to elicit 
rough estimates of the range of a citizen's judgments about the 
policy positions of the candidates. Then, ignoring questions of the 
citizen's utility function, we could estimate a model whose parameters 
include his point estimate of the candidate's positions and his 
estimates of their nearest and furthest points from his ideal. 
Finally, it would be desirable to test some of the 
correlates of the models. Do the defensive voters tend to be cynical 
and the credulous voters trusting? Are partisans credulous about 
their own party's candidate and defensive about the other party's 
candidate? Are indP.pendents mean value voters? Are those who 
leave a party and become independents more cynical and more 
defensive voters than those who switch part.ies? 
ELECTORAL IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE VOTER DEC ISION RULES 
Do different theories of individual voting behavior 
produce correspondingly different implications for the operations 
or outcomes of electoral processes? We cannot begin to make a 
comprehensive study of such questions at the present time. But we 
can present a few examples which show that the differing models 
advanced in the previous section have differing implications for 
candidate behavior and electoral outcomes in some simple electoral 
contexts. 
It is well-known that if electoral competition is confined 
to a single dimension of public policy over which voters have 
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single-peaked preference functions, if all citizens vote, and if 
majority rule determines the outcome, then the median citizen's most 
preferred point is the equilibrium outcome of the electoral 
process. This is the substance of Duncan Black's "median 
dominance" theorem.2 1  Black's theorem is stated in the context of
decision-making under certainty where candidate take exact positions 
which are communicated to the electorate without error or distortion. 
Shepsle has previously demonstrated that the introduction 
of uncertainty into the electoral process can upset the median 
dominance theorem.22 Specifically, if a majority of voters is
"risk acceptant" in some interval of the policy space containing 
the median ideal point, then a risky strategy exists which can 
defeat the median in a majority vote. Shepsle's interpretation is 
that a relatively certain incumbent can be beaten by an uncertain 
challenger if voters are "gamblers." Risky strategies which defeat 
the median are never themselves in equilibrium, however. And if 
voters tend to be risk-averse, rather than risk acceptant (a common 
supposition), then the median defeats risky strategies pitted 
against it. 
What happens when voters are not restricted to expected 
utility maximizing behavior? What if, for example, we have an 
electorate of defensive voters? Generally speaking, Black's 
theorem would still hold. Consider figure 6: 
21. 
A 
F.igure 6: Uncer tain Candidate vs. Median, Defensive Voting 
Candida te A is at the median in the figure, while candidate B 
projec ts an uncer tain s tra tegy which includes the median. Assuming 
voters have single-peaked symme tric preference functions, and vote 
defensively, A not only wins, he wins unanimously. Every member 
of the electorate finds himself closer to the median than to the 
23 mos t distan t point of candida te B's range. This conclusion 
generalizes to all cases in which the range of one candidate's 
positions lies completely wi thin the range of the o ther's. The less 
uncertain candidate wins unanimously in all such cases. Thus, 
given an electora te of defensive voters, each candtg�te should 
try to cover a proper subset of the other candidate's s trategy 
range. Clearly, if applied repeatedly, this candidate strategy 
leads both candida tes to converge to a single point, and if tha t 
point is no t the median, to jump to the median. 
Wha t is candidate's strategy ranges are not variables 
under their control, as seems likely in the real world? After the 
primary process for example, we might have a situation analogous to 
tha t outlined in figure 7: 
22 
A 
4
Figure 7: Two Candida te Election, Overlapping Uncertain Candidates 
In this figure one candidate is perceived to be somewha t to the 
right side of the median, while the other is mostly to the lef t, but 
they each overlap in an area around the median. Who wins? Clearly, 
the determining factor in this instance is the maximum distance of 
each candidate from the median voter. Here, for example, the 
riskier candidate, B, wins. Where candidate ranges do not overlap 
a t  all, the elec tion winner depends on the location and range of 
the candidate posi tions, much as is the case when candida tes are 
locked into poin t s trategies not a t  the median, or lot tery 
strategies whose expected value is not a t  the median (as presumed 
by Shepsle). Generally, whichever candidate manages to get his 
entire range closer to the median wins. 
I t  should be obvious tha t an electora te of credulous 
voters would produce implications precisely the opposite of those 
jus t enumerated. Take figure 6 fo� example. Voters 7-11 choose 
candida te B since his rightmost point is closer to them than the 
median, while voters 1-5 choose B since his leftmos t point is 
closer to them than the median. The median voter himself is 
indifferent. Thus, the riskier candidate B wins in this illus tra tion. 
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Moreover, optimal candidate behavior would be to continuously expand 
one's strategy to include the other candidate's strategy as a 
proper subset. Ultimately, both candidates would cover the entire 
policy dimension. 
What of situations in which the candidates's strategies 
are fixed, and one candidate's strategy is not a proper subset of 
the other's? (Figure 7 is one of an infinity of such situations). 
In general, it is not better to be either more or less risky. The 
actual outcome in each such case will depend on the precise location 
of each candidate's position distribution. All we can be sure of is 
that a range including the median defeats one which does not, given 
an electorate of credul0us voters.24 
The preceding discussion is artificial in two senses. 
First, it presumes that each voter perceives candidate uncertainty 
identically -- that citizens agree on candidate ranges. Second, it 
presumes electorates composed entirely of defensive voters or 
entirely of credulous voters. Nevertheless, our examples do show 
that differing models of decision-making under uncertainty produce 
differing implications about electoral processes. Candidate 
behavior changes, and expected electoral outcomes change as voter 
decision models �hange. Thus, given no general agreement on the 
appropriate model of individual decision-making under uncertainty, 
we would be wise to consider a variety of possibilities in our 
larger theoretical models of electoral processes. 
24 
UNCERTAINTY AND CANDIDATE STRATEGIES 
It may seem from the preceding section that the effects 
of uncertainty in real elections cannot be the objects of 
universal statements. However, we would prefer viewing the above 
analysis as adding a new aspect to rational models of candidate 
competition. Previous studies have emphasized that candidates 
t . t. 1 1 t. 25 h . f h . . . 26compe e in spa ia oca ions, t e certainty o t eir positions, 
and their emphasis on different issues.27 We find that they also 
could rationally compete by attempting to affect the rules citizens 
use in making their voting decisions. 
Some candidates campaign on their creditability, trying 
to induce credulous voU.ng. If the personality and background of 
the candidate make such an appeal successful, then he can afford 
to be ambiguous. His opponent may try to attack his vagueness, 
but such an attack would be to no avail if the electorate moves 
to credulous voting. Eisenhower provided the modern prototype of 
this strategy, with Carter's 1976 campaign attempting to emulate 
that model. 
By contrast, the candidate who induces defensive voting 
could harm himself by uncertainty, since he can be defeated by a 
candidate who gets "inside" his issue positions. Thus, the candidate 
who seems insincere or aloof might find uncertainty counterproductive 
in his campaign. Uncertainty would be taken as a confirmation of 
his other undesirable characteristics. 
Clearly.a candidate who takes a centrist position with 
certainty should seek to foster defensive voting. He should attack 
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the credibility of his opponent, so that any uncertainty would work 
to his benefit. Nixon's campaigns tended to be of this type -­
centrist campaigns which attacked the credibility of his opponents 
-- and Ford's 1976 campaign follows the same pattern. 
Given the nature of electoral politics, the incumbent 
running for reelection is likely to be viewed as a more known 
alternative than would be a challenger running for the presidency 
for the first time. According to our previous results, this means 
that the challenger would want to be viewed credulously. Two 
factors that can destroy such a strategy are campaign blunders and 
continued opposition to the challenger within his own party. Both 
make him less credible while inducing some citizens to react 
defensively. Indeed, we would suspect that these factors are more 
important in inducing defensive voting than is the prevailing 
level of voter cynicism about politics. In our view.the campaign 
blunders and intra-party rifts which characterized the Goldwater 
and McGovern campaigns induced a similar voter reaction -- high 
levels of defensive voting -- although the general level of voter 
cynicism was much lower in 1964 than in 1972. 
There is a paradox here. The candidate with the broad 
range who wants to be viewed credulously might find himself labeled 
irresponsible and defeated by a defensive electorate. The candidate 
with a narrow range who wants to be viewed defensively might find 
himself outflanked by a broad candidate who can make a credulous 
appeal. As a result, the conflict over the definition of the 
situation is at least as important as the differing positions, 
probabilities and emphases. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Uncertainty pervades voting, but previous studies have 
not made sufficient allowance for its effects. Once uncertainty 
is taken into account, we find that rational voting encompasses a 
wider variety of behavior than usually believed, that partisanship 
and candidate orientation become rational parts of the decision 
on how to vote, that survey research attempts to operationalize 
the rational model have been too limited, and that candidate 
competition includes competition over how the citizenry should 
react to the existing uncertainty. If all of this seems to make 
the study of voting less tidy, it also makes the study of voting 
more realistic.28 
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